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Energy Efficiency in Regulated and Deregulated Markets 
 
1. Introduction and Thesis 
 
The efficient use of electricity is a moral and environmental concern of contested 
economic validity.  Opponents argue that the pursuit of energy efficiency is the pursuit of 
economic inefficiency.  Proponents counter that the pursuit of economic efficiency in the 
electricity sector is an environmental disaster, due to market failures caused by 
environmental externalities and transaction costs.  In the interests of brevity, this paper 
focuses solely on end use efficiency, not generation or distribution efficiency.  This paper 
takes the position that there is merit in the pursuit of end-use energy efficiency measures 
in the electric sector (often called Demand Side Management, abbreviated to DSM).  
Energy efficiency measures can  be effective tools to correct market failures and achieve 
environmental goals, both in regulated and deregulated markets.  Although they are 
useful tools, energy efficiency measures are certainly not the only tools needed to correct 
these failures and achieve environmental goals.   
 
This paper also explores the effect of the new deregulatory era on the achievement of 
energy efficiency, arguing that this worthwhile goal can and should be kept.  The new 
deregulated environment has created a different market for electricity, but one that still 
has problems from an environmental and an economic point of view.  An effective policy 
must provide incentives to the actors best suited to overcome market failures in the new 
regulatory environment, and must be developed in a way that harmonizes energy 
efficiency policy with new environmental policies (particularly the development of 
emissions trading markets and renewable portfolio standards).   
 
Part Two of this paper defines energy efficiency.  Although there are multiple conflicting 
definitions of energy efficiency, here the term is used here in a hybrid economic and 
environmental sense.  That is, energy efficiency policies aim at setting social use of 
electricity at the level that would be set by consumers in a market where price reflects the 
true social cost of electricity in the absence of information and transaction costs.  Since 
that price does not exist and likely cannot be ascertained precisely, energy efficiency 
measures seek to approximate that price and level of impact.   
 
Part Three separates and identifies the relevant features of the regulated and deregulated 
eras.  “Deregulation” does not signal the end of regulation in the electricity sector but 
instead represents a new regulatory regime that requires an end to vertically integrated 
electric monopolies to allow a greater degree of competition, particularly in electricity 
generation.  Distribution is still monopolized, often operated by a regulated non-profit 
corporation, and retail supply is also monopolized in most American jurisdictions.  Thus 
there is a substantial role for regulators in a deregulated electricity sector.    However, 
energy efficiency measures developed in the regulated past of the electricity industry 
require re-examination and change during the new era of deregulation.   
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After establishing what energy efficiency, regulation, and deregulation mean, Part Four 
examines the policy justifications for energy efficiency regulations.  The underlying 
assumption of this section is that there has always been a role for environmental policy in 
the regulation of the electricity sector.  Determining the optimal way to provide 
electricity has always been treated by our society as a multi-criteria problem because it is 
a political problem – the interests of capitalists, consumers, and those affected by the 
environmental disruption (air pollution, dams) of electricity production are in conflict. 
Environmental considerations have always been and will always be a part of electricity 
policy. 
 
Most justifications for energy efficiency involve market imperfections, although energy 
security is often mentioned.  But the core question of any electricity policy in a 
capitalistic society is the optimal price for electricity.  In both a regulated and deregulated 
market, private actors will step in, where there is sufficient profit, to pursue energy 
efficiency measures.  Thus the core regulatory concern in a regulated or deregulated 
market should be correcting distortions in the price of electricity caused by poor 
regulation, unavoidable structural flaws in the market, or externalities.  In particular, 
environmental externalities are a serious consideration given that most of our electricity 
comes from fossil fuel combustion, nuclear power, and large hydro. 
 
But even if environmental externalities were adequately accounted for in electricity 
prices, there is a problem with social response to price signals in the electricity market.  
High transaction and information costs mean that price signals do not necessarily induce 
the expected response.  Electricity users seem to demand high rates of return on 
efficiency investments – often 30% or greater.  In other words, demand is less elastic than 
one would think it ought to be for a number of reasons.  Some key reasons are the high 
information and transaction costs encountered by end users. Electricity use is rarely a 
central business or home maintenance concern.  Gaining the information necessary to 
make energy saving decisions is expensive.  Further, decision makers must sort through 
numerous ways to invest their money.  Combined, these facts mean that decision makers 
set high hurdles for efficiency investments.     
 
Having examined the market failures and environmental externalities that motivate 
energy efficiency policy, I move on to consider the practical solutions to these problems 
that have been used by regulators.  Part Five of this paper provides an overview of end 
use energy efficiency in a regulated market.  Some of the inefficiencies of the regulated 
era were consequences of regulation, while others were consequences of market failures 
and externalities that had nothing to do with regulation.  Cost based ratemaking 
complicated efforts at end use efficiency because of the perverse incentives of utilities. 
 
Despite the complexities of energy efficiency policy in a regulated market, empirical 
evidence suggests that such policies were, in total, of net social benefit, although some 
were far more effective than others.  There is little dispute that government information 
provision programs aimed at lowering information costs to end users were of net social 
benefit.  While there is considerably more debate about the cost effectiveness of utility 
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DSM programs, it seems fair to conclude that utilities successfully encouraged customers 
to pursue many cost effective measures, and some that were likely not cost effective.   
 
Part Six considers the changes of deregulation.  Much of what was learned about energy 
efficiency in the past is still valid today.  Despite facial change in the deregulatory era, 
the fundamentals of energy efficiency policy have largely stayed the same because 
deregulation typically does not mean retail competition.  The principle of least social cost 
investment that lay behind avoided-cost measures can be used under a new name – often 
“Strategic Energy Assessment” or “Resource Portfolio Management”.   
 
Where deregulation has meant retail competition there are new considerations related to 
consumer response to price signals and the lack of a monopoly utility to manage a 
portfolio of resources, but many of the core considerations are the same as in 
monopolized markets.  The problems of transaction costs and environmental externalities 
loom large in both markets.  
 
The most significant change induced by deregulation is the end of the “avoided-cost” 
variation on traditional cost-based ratemaking that was used to induce energy efficiency 
and renewable energy measures.  In practice, deregulation means that regulators move 
from being the key coordinator of other actors to playing a more secondary role.  Prices 
take on the central coordinating function in the place of regulators, and regulators must 
instead seek to influence prices – either directly through taxes and charges, or indirectly 
through substantive rules (such as environmental market mechanisms) that have an effect 
on price. 
 
However, the price signals regulators want to send in a deregulated market are not 
primarily conservation signals.  The primary concern of regulators in a deregulated 
market is to avoid the structural problem – highly inelastic (short term) demand and 
supply, leading to the ability of suppliers to game the market by withholding power.  The 
tools to deal with these inelasticities are long term supply contracts and better 
information to consumers about bottlenecks in the system.1  Retail price reforms seek 
primarily to tackle this problem, and thus the price signals sent to consumers are aimed at 
decreasing peak demand, not lowering overall demand.  Hence deregulation coincides 
with a move to Real Time Pricing (RTP). 
 
RTP and similar price signals are likely to lead to increased efficiency of electricity use, 
but not to socially optimal demand for electricity.  There will still be space for end use 
energy efficiency measures, whether these take the form of market based environmental 
mechanisms (like pollution taxes), information provision, or more traditional DSM 
options.  Empirical evidence from California suggests that price signals for peak periods 
tend to induce load shifting and only a negligible overall load reduction.2  Thus RTP 
promises to increase the efficiency of electricity use by reducing the use of very 
expensive kilowatts.  This is undoubtedly a good thing.  However, it also means that to 
the extent that price in a deregulated market does not match marginal social costs there 
                                                 
1 Paul L. Joskow, California’s Electricity Crisis, 17 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 365, 386-7 (2001). 
2 See part 5 infra. 
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will be a less than optimal outcome.  And, given that the overall effect of RTP is to lower 
average electricity prices, the incentive to invest in energy efficiency measures is also 
lower.  In other words, RTP without accounting for externalities does little to improve 
environmental outcomes, and may even exacerbate problems. 
 
Thus to the extent that price cannot be suitably adjusted, or that price adjustments fail to 
counter the high transaction and information costs involved in trying to change electricity 
consumption patterns, the option to dictate performance and let price follow should be 
kept open by regulators through the use of a variety of sensitively used policy tools, such 
as emissions trading (ET) or energy efficiency portfolio standards (EEPS).  What is 
certain is that these transaction and information costs can be reduced cost-effectively – 
that is, some existing programs at the utility and federal level that target these problems 
show economic gains for society well above their costs.   
 
2. Defining Energy Efficiency 
 
Energy efficiency has no universally agreed definition.  Engineers think of energy 
efficiency from a thermodynamic perspective – maximizing the fit between the quality 
and quantity of energy needed to perform a task and the quality and quantity of energy 
embedded in our resources.  Many environmentalists argue that it means reduced use of 
electricity from harmful sources3 without too much regard for the marginal cost of 
electricity.  An economic definition would seem straightforward – the use of electricity in 
quantities consistent with the outcome of a perfect market.  Still others believe in a hybrid 
economic and environmental answer – the use of electricity at a level set by consumers in 
a market where price reflects the true social cost in the absence of information and 
transaction costs, and since that price does not exist and likely cannot be ascertained 
precisely, measures to approximate that price and level of impact.  This could also be 
thought of as the economic definition of energy efficiency – I separate it only because 
there could be good faith disputes about whether the information and transaction costs 
should be considered part of the “true” economic cost, or an obstacle to overcome on the 
way to better environmental outcomes.  Here I use energy efficiency to mean this last 
definition – a hybrid economic and environmental answer that accepts a progressive role 
for interfering with an otherwise functional market to reduce transaction and information 
costs.   
 
The efficiency of the electricity system has three parts – generation efficiency, 
transmission efficiency, and end use efficiency.  Generation efficiency means extracting 
as much energy from energy bearing resources as is economically efficient at a site where 
those resources are used to power the turbines or fuel cells that create an electric current.  
Transmission efficiency is the reduction of line losses to the most economically efficient 
level possible, as well as the planning and siting of energy sources in relation to human 
settlements to minimize transmission distances.  In the interests of brevity, neither of 
                                                 
3 Of course there is no agreement on what constitutes a harmful source.  Natural gas, nuclear power, waste 
to energy, large dams, and some small dams are all considered “good” sources of energy by some and 
“bad” sources by others. 
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these two areas is considered directly in this paper, except in so much as infrastructure 
investment can be obviated by the promotion of end use efficiency.  Instead this paper is 
focused largely on the last area, end use efficiency – reducing the electricity drawn from 
the grid by consumers without affecting their quality of life, such that electricity is used 
at a rate consistent with the marginal social cost of providing it. Generation and 
transmission efficiency are often referred to as supply side efficiency.  End use efficiency 
is often referred to as demand side management (DSM). 
 
These three parts are nonetheless related, and to some extent I must touch on supply side 
efficiency.  Integrated Resource Planning (IRP), a central component of energy efficiency 
planning under our former regulatory regime is essentially a combination of DSM and 
supply side investment efficiency to try and optimize resource use across all three aspects 
of the electric system.  In a nutshell, IRP is an attempt to include an economically 
efficient role for reductions of end use electricity consumption in the planning of 
transmission and generation capital investments.  Those investments in infrastructure that 
are more expensive than the implementation of measures that will reduce electricity 
consumption or reduce the growth of the electric load can be avoided.  Instead, the funds 
that would have been used to expand transmission and generation are invested in DSM. 
 
End Use Efficiency – DSM 
 
DSM itself is a broad term for a large number of measures.  The measures taken depend 
on the interests of the actors, and can be classified any number of ways – by who 
implements them, by the nature of the problem they try to address, etc.  A simple way to 
break them down is into three broad groups: performance standards, technology 
standards, and information provision measures.   
 
Performance standards set a target and then require the compelled party to meet it.  This 
group of measures gains popularity in a market based system, where a regulator can 
essentially set a performance standard for the market by trying to manipulate the price or 
create a market for a good such as “pollution reduction”.  A public example of this would 
be an Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard (EEPS), in which a government compels a 
utility to implement any actions they choose which collectively reduce electricity demand 
by consumers to a predetermined target.  A private example of this is a “performance 
contract”, in which a private entity approaches an electricity user and offers to reduce 
their electricity consumption from present levels to an agreed target, in exchange for a 
share of the savings achieved. 
 
A technology standard mandates a specific course of action.  For example, a regulator 
may mandate which type of electric cable a utility can use because the regulator believes 
that this cable will allow only a minimal amount of electricity loss to resistance.  
Technology standards are often equated with “command and control” regulation, but 
often have lower administrative costs than performance standards.  For example, it is 
simpler to mandate the use of a certain standard of home insulation than it is to verify that 
the home is only losing a certain amount of heat through its walls. 
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Information provision measures exist to overcome information barriers.  These rules 
mandate, for example, that a utility present to its customers information about their 
electricity consumption relative to some yardstick – their own past consumption, or the 
consumption of similar but better performing consumers.  
 
Another convenient way to quickly classify DSM measures is by market structure and 
actor: 4 
 
Utility conservation measures are typically forced upon a monopoly provider by 
regulators.  These measures include information provision to customers, rebates, direct 
installation of energy efficient appliances or energy saving devices, and giveaways of 
such products, as well as the rate charges used to finance the above methods. 
 
Private sector conservation measures are performed or suggested by for profit entitities 
that advise clients on how to either reduce their electric bill or reduce their environmental 
impact.  This often takes the shape of “performance contracting”.  A private actor 
(sometimes a utility subsidiary), often referred to as an energy service company (ESCO), 
will contract with a client to reduce their electricity bill and take a share of the energy 
savings over a period of time.  Similary an environmental consultant will help a client to 
implement conservation measures and build private renewable energy generation 
facilities.  The actual techniques here include all of those used by utilities as well as fuel 
switching and self generation using technologies that are more environmentally friendly, 
or at least no worse, than existing utility technologies.  But the area of self generation as 
an energy efficiency measure will not be explored in this paper since it raises new 
regulatory issues related to licensing, siting, net metering, and utility exit fees. 
 
Peak load reduction measures – conducted by either utilities or private actors, this 
includes load shifting and interruptible power.  Load shifting means convincing users to 
engage in energy intensive activities at non-peak hours.  Interruptible power means 
contracting with customers to allow the utility to stop providing power or reduce the 
power level provided under certain conditions (for example at peak periods).  It is unclear 
that load shifting or interrupting power reduce overall power use for a customer, they 
simply smooth the variability of customer demand.  In recent variable pricing 
experiments in California, peak prices eight times greater than normal prices led 
overwhelmingly to load shifting (a cut in peak demand of 15% on average), and to a 
negligible reduction in overall load for the monitored periods.5  
 
                                                 
4 Scott F. Bertschi, Integrated Resource Planning and Demandside Management in Electric Utility 
Regulation: Public Utility Panacea or a Waste of Energy?, 43 Emory L. J. 815, 843-45 (1994); John H. 
Chamberlin and Patricia M. Herman, How Much DSM is Really There? A Market Perspective, 24(4) 
Energy Policy 323, 326 (1996). The categorization scheme is mine. 
5 Charles River Associates, Impact Evaluation of the California Statewide Pricing Pilot, Final Report 4,   
March 16, 2005.  Available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/demandresponse. (CRA Report); personal 
communication with Michael Messenger, Demand Response Project Manager, California Energy 
Commission. 
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Decentralized & Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 
 
New generation is not an efficiency measure in general. However, while energy 
efficiency should be seen as distinct from renewable energy, the two are often related in 
regulatory policy discussions for several reasons. 
 
One aspect of renewable energy is decentralized generation with net metering (the option 
for the generator to sell extra electricity back to the grid).  This is a type of efficiency 
measure – a consumer decides that it is worth it to them, for fiscal or other reasons 
(security of supply, personal or political desire to be “green”, tax incentives) to produce 
some of their own electricity.  In industry this may happen where a factory produces a 
combustible byproduct that can be burned on site to generate power for the facility.  So 
long as the on site generation is held to the same pollution control standards as large 
generating plants, the environmental impact is at least neutral.  And if the source of the 
on-site electricity is a low-pollution source then it is a net environmental benefit.   
 
Another intersection between renewables and efficiency is that energy efficiency is often 
used as a way of reducing environmental externalities such as greenhouse gas emissions, 
or the gaseous, solid, or liquid emission of toxins from power plants.  This concern with 
reducing environmental externalities also intersects with “renewable energy”, which is a 
catch all term for the sources of fuel with lower externalities meant to replace the 
undesirable sources with higher externalities.   
 
In economic theory these environmental externalities should be dealt with by 
internalizing their cost through pollution taxes or other measures.  In reality this is 
politically difficult to accomplish and the optimal taxes cannot be calculated. Since 
reduced demand for electricity will, ceteris paribus, indirectly lead to reductions in 
negative environmental impacts, environmentalists look at energy efficiency as an 
important second best way of tackling pollution alongside the promotion of renewable 
energy and pollution taxes.  Additionally, those promoting the creation of markets in 
tradable pollution and renewable energy credits worry about the impact of energy 
efficiency measures on the integrity of their commodities. 
 
3. Defining Regulation and Deregulation 
 
Until very recently American electricity markets were all regulated monopolies.  That is, 
until the close of the 1980s both entry and price were regulated by state and federal 
government law.6  But several important changes occurred in sequence.  First, the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) began, in the 1980’s, to change their policies to 
a more pro-competitive stance.7  Congress subsequently passed the Energy Policy Act of 
1992.8  This lowered entry barriers for new generation technologies.9  Two years later the 
                                                 
6 John S. Moot, Economic Theories of Regulation and Electricity Restructuring, 25 Energy L. J. 273, 274 
(2004). 
7 Id. 
8 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992). 
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California Public Utilities Commission began to restructure the electricity sector in 
California10, and in 1996 FERC took another step to encourage competition in the 
generation sector by ordering all utilities to provide full access to their grids.11  This 
section explores the difference between the market structure prevalent in the 1960s to 
1980s, and the market trends since the mid 1990s. 
The Regulated Market 
 
A regulated electricity market is characterized by the existence of a vertically integrated 
electricity monopolist.  That is, one firm owns the generating capacity, the high voltage 
transmission grid, the lower voltage distribution network going to individual consumers, 
and contracts directly with those consumers to provide electricity.  In this market a 
utility’s rate is set by a regulator, who endeavours through cost-based ratemaking to set a 
“fair” price for electricity.  Since the market is monopolized the electric utility faces a 
downward sloping demand curve, and thus the monopolist’s marginal revenue is less than 
the price.  Like any rational monopolist in this situation, the utility should restrict 
quantity to increase price and maximize total revenue - meaning that they will 
underproduce relative to market demand.  Instead of allowing this to unfold, the regulator 
tries to provide a rate of compensation that approximates the average cost of the utility.   
 
Cost-based ratemaking tries to ascertain the costs incurred by the utility, tack on a 
reasonable profit, and then divide this cost amongst the utility’s customers in some 
fashion.  Under this basic system a utility has essentially no incentive to reduce the 
electricity consumption of its users.  Its incentive is to include every possible cost that 
will be allowed, and encourage the growth of demand to justify increased capacity 
investment.  As will be explored below, encouraging energy efficiency in a regulated 
market often involves manipulating the utility’s compensation formula to avoid this 
problem. 
The “Deregulated” Market 
 
A deregulated market is characterized primarily by the dismemberment of vertically 
integrated utilities in an attempt to create competitive generation markets.  The 
transmission grid is put in charge of an Independent System Operator (ISO), who then 
opens access to the grid equally to all qualified generators.  The generation arm of the 
business is either spun off or forced to sell assets, while generators from outside of the 
state are allowed to “wheel in” power.  Generation is expected to become competitive.  
Transmission remains a regulated monopoly because to date no one has been convinced 
that it makes sense to have competing power lines to the same customers.12 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 Moot, supra note 8 at 274. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 An example of this is my home province of Ontario, in which the crown monopoly (Ontario Hydro) was 
disassembled, control of the grid was placed in the hands of the Independent Market Operator (IMO); and 
the generating assets of the corporation were privatized as Ontario Power Generation, which was then 
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The retail end of the market is a far murkier story.  Retail competitition is an interesting 
possibility, but has not come to pass in most jurisdictions.  Although 24 states passed 
retail competition laws, 8 repealed or suspended them since June 2000 (the California 
Energy Crisis), and every other state that had been considering retail competititon 
dropped the issue as of 2004.13 Retail competition in some of those states that allow it 
seems to be unsuccessful – despite large expenditures by competitors very few customers 
were initially lured from the incumbent utility.14  
 
An “economic theory of regulation” explanation for the rise and fall of the retail 
competition movement has been proposed.15 On this view, the push to deregulate came in 
large part because of the potential to get lower cost electricity (particularly from new 
facilities burning natural gas) in a competitive market.  Within this was a push to allow 
retail competition, at first supported by politicians seeking to allow voters to capture the 
benefits of lower prices.16  As this rationale began to fade because the price gaps between 
regulated and deregulated prices were not sufficiently large to stimulate political 
entrepeneurs, the push to retail competition was continued by utilities who wanted the 
ability to recover stranded debt from consumers – the utilities would, in exchange for 
allowing retail competition, be allowed to charge all of the “stranded” liabilities of their 
generating assets to whoever purchased power in the market because regulators would 
establish a debt charge that was competitively neutral.17  Then came the energy crisis in 
California.  Politically this drove a stake into the future of retail competition – retail price 
caps were maintained, and in the service areas of San Diego Gas & Electric they were 
instantly reinstated.18  Other states have not yet toyed with the idea of allowing 
consumers to experience variable rates, despite the suggestions of economists that with 
sufficient long term contracting variable rates should not generate massive price 
fluctuations.19   
 
Competitive generation presents an interesting dilemma for energy efficiency.  On the 
one hand, the first deregulatory experiment in California showed disastrous markets 
plagued by highly inelastic supply and demand.  Energy efficiency can be attractive in 
such an environment.  Just as electricity retailers can choose to lock into long term 
contracts to control price volatility, they can also choose to pay for efficiency measures 
or load shifting if they feel that this will help them avoid paying high spot prices for 
electricity.  The same incentive to avoid using electricity is also felt by consumers when 
high prices are passed on.  On the other hand, if competition eventually leads to lower 
prices it renders energy efficiency less attractive.  In a market without adjustments for 
                                                                                                                                                 
forced to privatize some assets immediately and aim to have no more than 30% of the province’s 
generating capacity over the next few years.  Another example is California.  See Joskow, supra note 2. 
13 Moot, supra note 8 at 299. 
14 Harry M. Trebing, Electricity: Changes and Issues, 17 Review of Industrial Organizations 61, 72 (2000). 
15 John S. Moot, supra note 7 at 299. 
16 Id. at 289. 
17 Id. at 297. 
18 Severin Borenstein, The Trouble With Electricity Markets: Understanding California’s Restructuring 
Disaster, 16(1) Journal of Economic Perspectives 191, 193 (2002). 
19 Id. at 204-205. 
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uncompensated environmental externalities the price of power can be expected to stay far 
below social cost, meaning that many socially desirable efficiency measures will not be 
performed. 
 
As a final note, it is very important to distinguish between marginal cost pricing in a 
competitive retail market and Real Time Pricing (RTP).  The two are independent – one 
can have RTP without competitive pricing, or a competitive retail market without RTP.  
Currently, almost all homes and buildings have meters that record aggregate electricity 
use for a period of several months.  The unit of electricity being supplied to the end user, 
therefore, is not individual kilowatt hours, but aggregate kilowatt hours over a several 
month block, with no indication of the time or date upon which that power was used.  So 
the marginal cost set by our (hypothetical) competitive retail market is the marginal cost 
of providing several months of electricity.20 Providing consumers with RTP requires a 
new generation of metering and communication technology, but the transition to this new 
generation technology seems to be fast approaching.21 
 
In contrast to the aggregate nature of retail electricity prices, the marginal cost in the spot 
markets depends essentially on hourly demand and the production decisions of generators 
– and thus changes with the daily and seasonal peaks in demand.  Thus the “marginal” 
cost in the retail market is a very strange thing.  Typically we think of marginal cost 
pricing not only as the price derived in a perfectly competitive market, but also as a price 
signal that accurately conveys the cost of the last unit of a good produced to the 
purchaser.  On the conventional view a marginal cost signal would tell the consumer who 
demands kilowatts at a peak period that these are very expensive kilowatts she is asking 
for.  But most consumers are completely unaware of the current price of electricity when 
they flip a switch.  They know only what they are billed for their total use over the 
several month billing period.  And while suppliers know how much electricity each 
customer has demanded over this period, they don’t know when each kilowatt hour was 
demanded. 
 
The lack of RTP is important because it means that consumers cannot react to daily or 
weekly high prices by curtailing demand.  But RTP may become more common as a 
consequence of deregulation - experiments are currently under way in California22, and 
RTP is already offered to large customers in New York and parts of Canada.23  RTP is a 
function of technology, and can be used in a regulated market as easily as it can in a 
market without price controls.  Competition and RTP are often mentioned together 
because competition creates a need for RTP.  Competition in generation allows 
generators to behave strategically and withhold power to drive up the price.  Enabling 
                                                 
20 This is not a full story.  Some large consumers in the regulated market were given time of use rates, 
variable rates that do change within a billing period. 
21 Michael Messenger, Will the Advanced Metering Initiative and the Introduction of Dynamic Pricing 
Rates Effect the Content and Management of Utility Rate Cases in California and Beyond?, Presentation 
for Managing the Modern Utility Rate Case, February 17th & 18th, 2005, Las Vegas, Nevada. 
22 See infra part 5. 
23 Fred Beck and Eric Martinot, Renewable Energy Policies and Barriers, p.19, in Cutler J. Cleveland, ed., 
Encylopedia of Energy, Academic Press/Elsevier Science, 2004 
 11
consumers to avoid rigid consumption and instead respond to higher prices is therefore an 
important counterbalance.   But RTP and competition are separate analytical issues. 
 
In sum, deregulation seems to mean competitive generation, monopolized transmission, 
and largely monopolized retail provision, with the possible development of competitive 
retail and/or RTP in some jurisdictions. 
 




This section examines the theoretical justifications for energy efficiency policy. Since 
energy efficiency policy is an intervention into a functioning electricity market, it should 
be justified by some market failures that explain why the current market mechanism is in 
need of adjustment.  Proponents of energy efficiency policies have spent considerable 
energy developing such justifications, some of which are heavily contested (especially by 
economists), while others are more widely accepted.  The key justifications presented are 




Although not directly an economic argument, this has been the most politically visible 
reason expounded by proponents of energy efficiency to take advantage of public 
concern. Historically, this is the origin of energy efficiency programs after the oil scares 
of 1973 and 1979.24  The key difficulty with this argument is that it might justify driving 
smaller cars but doesn’t work well for the electric sector.  Today, after regulatory 
encouragement and market forces at work for 20 years, oil powers an extremely small 
part of electric generation.25  What is more, dependence on foreign oil or on imported 
natural gas can easily be reduced by increased use of coal – an environmentally 
undesirable outcome under present business practices, though happily, change is on the 
horizon.26  
 
Energy security is a red herring, but it has phenomenal political traction.  There are two 
more logical reasons to engage in energy conservation measures put forward by 
                                                 
24 Ronald J. Sutherland, The Economics of Energy Conservation Policy, 24(4) Energy Policy 361, 362. 
25 For example, President Carter’s Coal Conversion Policy that encouraged utilities to switch from oil to 
coal.  See Bertschi, supra note 5 at 824. 
26 There is great potential for more expensive but far more environmentally friendly forms of coal use on 
the horizon.  Coal gasification technologies already exist.  Technologies that are moving out of the trial 
stages exist that will allow the gas stream to be separated into separate components.  The result is a cleaner 
burning fuel stream that, when subjected to existing pollution control technologies, will be close to zero-
emission. The carbon can be separated out during this process and sequestered.  Thomas Homer-Dixon and 
S. Julio Freedmann, Out of the Energy Box, 83(6) Foreign Affairs 72 (2004). 
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advocates.  Both are market failures.  The first reason to engage in energy conservation is 
the failure of the market to account for environmental externalities in electricity prices.  
This argument is a “wrong price” argument –that electricity is priced incorrectly from a 
social point of view.  The second argument centers on a variety of structural flaws and 
transaction and information costs that create imperfect markets.   Here the issue is the 
“wrong” reaction – the price signal is lost or distorted on the way to the consumer.   
  
The Wrong Price - Environmental Externalities & Perverse Subsidies 
 
There is one very strong reason to engage in energy efficiency measures: the existence of 
environmental externalities.  There is widespread agreement that environmental 
externalities exist in electricity generation.27  Environmental concerns are therefore a 
critical consideration in any electricity sector policy. 
 
This is hardly new.  The provision of electricity is a multi-criteria problem.  The manner 
in which electricity is to be provided is expected to be affordable for consumers, 
universally available, profitable for the investor owned utilities, dependable for all, not 
environmentally damaging in general, and in particular respectful of existing uses of 
communal environmental resources such as farmland downwind of powerplants or rivers 
that are used for both hydroelectric generation and transport.  Since the dawn of 
electricity regulation, up through the National Energy Policy Act in the late 1970s, 
PURPA, and into the deregulatory era there have always been at least two stated goals for 
electricity policy – affordable power and environmental protection.28 Admittedly the goal 
of affordability tends to dominate, but states and the FERC have used a variety of tools to 
promote environmental ends in electricity policy, including certification and siting of 
plants, mandatory environmental impact analysis, resource planning and conservation 
measures.29   
 
Environmental externalities are price distortions – the price of fossil fuels seems cheap 
relative to their social cost because part of their social cost is not included in the purchase 
price.   
 
Environmental externalities can be divided many ways, but the simplest for our purposes 
is into three categories.  First, there are those externalities that we are aware of and feel 
secure that we can quantify with a reasonably certain margin of error.  Examples of this 
would be the best studied negative health effects of oxides of sulfur and nitrogen, ozone, 
and large sized (10 microns and greater) particulate matter from fossil fuel combustion, 
or the injury, loss of life, and increased occurrence of lung disease in coal miners.   
                                                 
27 Sutherland, supra note 26 at 367; Rudy Perkins, Note: Electricity Deregulation, Environmental 
Externalities and the Limitations of Price, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 993, 994(1998); Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel 
L. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics 641, Pearson Prentice Hall, New Jersey, Sixth Edition (2004). 
28 Perkins, supra note 29 at 997-1005.   
29 Michael Dworkin, David Farnsworth and Jason Rich, Symposium Article: The Environmental Duties of 
Public Utility Commissioners, 18 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 325 (2001) (collecting groups of states that regulate 
certification, siting, environmental analysis, and plan resource, conservation, and restructuring measures to 
effect environmental goals). 
 13
 
A second category of externalities are those we are aware of but whose costs we cannot 
quantify completely – either because we lack information about the chain of causality or 
we lack market prices for the impacted goods and attempts to develop hedonic prices 
have not clearly led to an accepted answer.  Examples include the global warming related 
costs of carbon dioxide, the impact of mercury from coal burning on mental retardation in 
fetuses and small children, the extinction of species and loss of habitat caused by water 
and air pollution, etc.   
 
The third category of externalities are those whose existence we are only now getting 
hints of or simply don’t know about at all.  Until relatively recently most of the potential 
effects of releasing carbon dioxide fell into this category, and many still do.  This third 
category is a bogeyman of sorts because one can always claim that there are new troubles 
around the corner.  But given the human experience of industrialization and 
environmental degradation over the past 200 years some degree of awareness that there 
will be future problems is not paranoid but simply a realistic, safe and conservative 
assumption.  The implication is not that we should stop growing our economy or 
exploring new technologies, rather that we should keep one eye open for the first signs of 
unanticipated impacts. 
 
The first type of externality can be considered internalizable because, at least in principle, 
the type of injury, causal path, and value of the injury are known and therefore can be 
traced back to the relevant transactions.  Of course, to the extent that the injuries occur far 
in the future and to unknown people with unknown values there are argument about 
discount rates and appropriate prices, but this is the type of externality with the smallest 
burden.  The second and third types of externalities are largely uninternalizable.  Without 
adequate knowledge of the types of injuries sustained, their approximate value, and the 
causal mechanisms involved, tracing a quantifiable injury back to a specific transaction 
becomes near impossible.   
 
All forms of electricity generation, including the renewable ones, have externalities 
associated with them over the life cycle of the generation process – construction of 
generation equipment, use, and disposal.  Unfortunately, electricity generation from 
centralized fossil fuel burning power plants is both the dominant form of electricity 
generation and has the highest known and quantified externalities. 
 
One typical set of figures puts the costs as follows30:  
Generation Technology External cost in cents per kWh 
Solar  0-0.4 
Wind 0-0.1 
Biomass 0-0.7 
Waste to energy 4.0 
Coal 2.5-2.8 
                                                 
30 Steven Ferrey, Exit Strategy: State Legal Discretion to Environmentally Sculpt the Deregulating 
Electricity Environment, 26 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 109, 121-30 (2002) (citing primarily Pace Univ. Ctr. for 
Envtl. Legal Stud., Environmental Costs of Electricity (1990)). 
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Oil 2.5-6.7 
Natural gas 0.7-1.0 
Nuclear 2.91 
 
These figures are as disputable as all externality figures. First, they account for only a 
limited number of externalities.31 Second, they assume certain levels of pollution control 
technologies or none at all, depending on the source.32  Nonetheless, even at this limited 
level, the external costs of oil, coal, and waste to energy add considerably to the costs of 
power from these sources.  Even natural gas displays a significant external cost relative to 
the price of the gas itself.   
 
While in theory these externalities are best dealt with through a pollution tax, in practice 
a pollution tax is difficult to establish.  Proponents of energy efficiency measures argue 
that since these measures reduce electricity consumption they also reduce pollution, and 
that as such the cost of efficiency measures should be compared to the marginal price of 
electricity, plus the costs of calculated externalities.  This is one of the bases of the 
environmental argument that the cost in “cost-based ratemaking” requires adjustments.  
 
But the uninternalizable externalities discussed above are of relevance too.  Taking the 
figures in the table as a baseline one could add the costs of global warming if they were 
known, the value of lost species were it calculable, and the costs of mercury loading if we 
understood more about how mercury moves from air to water and into human food 
supplies. Even without considering the issue of appropriate discount rates and the 
calculation of prices in the absence of liquid markets, it is clear that externalities create a 
difficult consideration for electricity policy that is hard to reduce to dollars. 
 
One policy tool often used in this kind of situation is risk analysis.  Where rendering the 
costs in monetary terms cannot be done, it is still possible to assign some risk factors to 
the potential consequences of various externalities and then make quantitative decisions 
about what level of pollution risk we are willing to run.  From there we can work 
backwards.  Rather than setting a pollution tax to approximate external costs and letting 
the market establish the quantity of pollution emitted we can set the quantity of pollution 
that may be emitted and then allow those that need to emit that pollution to compete for 
the right to do so and thereby generate a market price for pollution.  This is the basic idea 
behind “cap and trade” programs.  Energy efficiency is one factor in such pollution 
control programs. If pollution has a price then when consumers of electricity reduce their 
consumption through energy efficiency someone – either the consumer, their 
performance contractor, the retail distributor, or the generator will capture the benefits of 
that action and claim the pollution reduction for themselves.  The pollution reductions of 
improved efficiency must be accounted for in any future pollution market – first because 
those making the reductions deserve credit, and second because since the reductions are 
of value someone will try to claim them, which can cause disputes about the credibility of 
achieved pollution reductions. 
 
                                                 
31 Id. fns. 67-90. 
32 Id. 
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The discussion to this point has been theoretical, particularly of the currently 
uninternalized externalities.  Thus I wish to present one example to underline the 
seriousness of the distortion caused by neglect of environmental impacts, and therefore 
why I feel that there is such room for energy efficiency measures to help fill the gap 
between the savings achieved in the current market and those that would be achieved in a 
market where electricity was used at a rate commensurate with its marginal social cost.  
The example is climate change, a currently uninternalized externality of fossil fuel 
combustion. 
 
The physicist Robert Socolow has initiated a multi year study on human options to 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with our climate.33  The study’s framework 
is based on what Socolow calls ‘stabilization wedges’.  The idea is that human emissions 
of carbon into the atmosphere are projected to continue growing over the next 50 years, 
assuming that no effort is made to affect them.  To avoid elevating the level of carbon in 
the atmosphere too much higher than it already is will therefore require curtailing growth 
in emissions as well as cutting emissions to below current levels.  Socolow’s target is a 
reduction of at least 15 billion tons of carbon equivalent per year by 2050, and he 
considers each billion tons to be a single ‘wedge’, a small piece of the larger effort to 
avoid making climate change any more dramatic than it will already be.  This level of 
reductions aims at stabilizing the carbon content of the atmosphere well above today’s 
350 ppm, but below the possible levels of 550 ppm or higher that some analysts project 
may be reached by next century.34  Thus Socolow defines a ‘stabilization wedge’ as an 
action that, by 2050, will lead to the avoidance of 1 billion tons of emitted carbon per 
year.  Assuming that reducing emissions from American coal fired power plants was to 
constitute only one wedge, or 1/15th of humanity’s effort to limit the damage of climate 
change35, Socolow has concluded that a price of $100 per ton would be needed to reach 
this wedge.36  A typical 1000 megawatt coal plant, without some sort of carbon 
sequestration technology, emits 1.5 million tons of carbon per year.37  The $100 per ton 
needed under this scenario, given a few simplifying assumptions, translates into 
approximately 2 cents per kwh.38  That is, under a set of fairly conservative assumptions, 
and forgetting all the other externalities, global warming in itself should add 
approximately 2 cents per kwh to current electricity prices. 
 
Thus environmental externalities exist and are real.  They prompt serious discussions 
about the appropriate cost of electricity, which in turn seriously impacts the 
determination of which energy efficiency policies make economic sense and which do 
not. Externalities also create an incentive for market based pollution control policies, in 
which there is a necessary role for energy efficiency.   
 
                                                 
33 Presentation of Robert Socolow at U.C. Berkeley’s Physics Department, April 2004. 
34 Id. 
35 This is, to put it lightly, a mild contribution on a per capita basis.  America is currently responsible for 
something close to 25% of the world’s carbon emissions, and the two largest shares of that 25% are 
generated by coal burning and vehicle use. 
36 Elizabeth Kolbert, The Climate of Man III, New Yorker 52, 55 (May 9, 2005). 
37 Id. at 55. 
38 Id. at 56. 
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But environmental externalities are not the only price distortion.  There are also large 
public subsidies to the use of fossil fuels: budgetary transfers, tax incentives, R&D, 
liability insurance provision, public leases and rights of way, waste disposal, and project 
financing or fuel risk guarantees.39  The World Bank and International Energy Agency 
provide estimates for annual public subsidies for fossil fuels that range between $100 and 
$200 billion worldwide with a high level of uncertainty.40  This is relative to global 
expenditure of approximately $1 trillion on fossil fuels in 2004.41  This is a massive 
distortion in the price of fossil fuels, and therefore in the social cost of electricity 
generated from fossil fuels.   
 
The basic theoretical conclusion is that environmental externalities and public subsidies 
need to be accounted for in determining the true social cost of electricity in any market.  
And given that this is impossible in practice, energy efficiency measures aimed at 
counteracting this distortion are justifiable.   
 
The “Wrong” Reaction - Barriers Created by Transaction and 
Information Costs 
 
Internalizing all environmental externalities into the price of electricity, if such a feat 
were even possible, would not eliminate the case for energy efficiency.  For this to be the 
case, our markets must be perfect markets – with full information, no transaction costs, 
etc..  This section shows that current markets are not efficient.  Theory and experience 
suggest that information and transaction costs are serious barriers, and, at least in the 




The basic position of conservation proponents can be reduced to three points:  
 
“(1) Market barriers exist and they discourage investments in energy conservation that 
would otherwise be cost-effective.   Or market imperfections preclude private decisions 
from attaining a level of energy efficiency consistent with economic efficiency. 
 
“(2) The level of energy efficiency investments that have been (and are being) undertaken 
by normal markets is short of the truly cost effective level, creating an 'energy efficiency 
gap' that should be closed.  
 
“(3) Energy efficiency investments that are estimated to be cost-effective should be 
encouraged by govemment policy and utility programmes.”42 
 
                                                 
39 Beck and Martinot, supra note 25 at 4 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Sutherland, supra note 26 at 362 (collecting the work of proponents including Steven Nadel, Eric Hirst, 
Ralph Cavanagh, Amory Lovins, and David Moskovitz). 
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In summary, the economic counter argument to this general line of reasoning is that the 
current outcome, when judged by people’s willingness to pay, and looking at the 
tradeoffs amongst all the factors in a decision (input of energy, capital, labour, lower vs. 
higher sunk costs) may be the economically efficient outcome.43  Transaction and 
information costs are not imaginary, they are real and no less legitimate than other costs.  
Energy inefficiencies are signs of a functioning market – one where the scarce time of 
consumers is properly valued.   
 
As will be explored below, this debate is somewhat misleading.  While the economists 
who hold this view may technically be correct, the empirical reality is that information 
and transaction costs can be reduced at a net social benefit.  And as such, it should be 
done.  Whether it should be done by utilities or the government is an interesting question.  
The federal government’s Energy Star program has been successful at overcoming 
information barriers that have no local dimension, but in theory a utility, where it still 
exists, is the best placed entity to pursue a localized subset of energy efficiency measures 
since they can capture savings in infrastructure investment and thus may wish to target 
their efforts to capture efficiency savings to certain locations within their grid. 
 
There is a point of agreement between conservationists and economists that oppose 
energy efficiency measures.  Both groups tend to agree that regulation causes some of the 
market failures that energy efficiency measures are supposed to address.  Economists 
point, for example, to utility prices fixed at average instead of marginal costs.44 
Economists argue that the solution to this type of problem is competitive retail and 
energy generation markets, not regulation on top of regulation.  But environmentalists 
argue that many market barriers are not regulatory but are structural problems of our 
system for production and consumption of electricity, or the effects of information and 
transaction costs that can be reduced cost-effectively. 
 
The barriers most often listed by environmentalists are: 
 
Cross subsidies – traditional cost-based ratemaking is meant to solve the problem 
created by a natural monopoly by setting the price the utility charges at the utility’s 
average cost.  Thus without marginal cost pricing consumers are not actually aware what 
their electricity really costs society.  Even with full internalization of externalities, this 
could be a problem.  Assuming that there is some cross-subsidization amongst 
consumers, the subsidized customers are incentivized to use too much electricity.45  
 
Critics point out that this is an argument for abolishing rate regulation or at least cross-
subsidization, not for creating market distorting conservation requirements to fix an 
existing market distortion.46  But note that deregulation has not meant competitive retail 
                                                 
43 Sutherland, supra note 26 at 366. 
44 Id. 
45 Bertschi, supra note 5 at 827-28. 
46 Id. 
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pricing for most classes of retail customers, nor does it appear to be in the offing, despite 
earlier talk of ‘retail wheeling’.47   
 
Split Incentives – Decisions about electricity investments in end use efficiency are often 
made by people who don’t pay the electric bills - such as landlords, architects and 
builders.  Critics argue that in a functioning market the more efficient house should 
command a price premium.48  Supporters of energy efficiency respond that while this 
would be true in a perfectly competitive market without information asymmetries or 
transaction costs, that world only exists in textbooks.  Critics respond that, in the real 
world, there is little evidence from the rental housing market to support the hypothesis 
that rental units have lower levels of energy efficiency than private units.49  Despite the 
existence of a debate over split incentives, they are regarded as a real phenomenon by 
regulators.  In recent work both the EPA and the National Commission on Energy Policy 
cite split incentives as a market barrier to energy efficiency.50  Split incentives are also an 
accepted justification for energy efficiency in Europe.51 
 
Transaction costs and information costs – The cost to individuals, particularly 
residential consumers, in time and effort to develop the expertise necessary to implement 
energy efficiency measures are large relative to the potential benefits they will see.  But 
the needed expertise and proprietary knowledge are actually in the hands of the utility. 
Thus much regulation is designed to deal with the paradox that the party with the least 
incentive to engage in energy conservation and reduction of generation capacity 
investment is also the most efficient saver of electricity.  Indeed, in markets where 
deregulation looks imminent utilities have been quick to develop subsidiary companies 
that capitalize on their technical knowledge to do performance contracting.52  
 
The transaction and information costs faced by consumers are substantial.  EPA asserts 
that manufacturers make claims about energy efficiency, and thus information is 
available to consumers, but the information is often incomplete and inconsistent.53  This 
leaves residential consumers to sort between products, from small appliances to houses, 
with a large range of up front costs and potential energy savings, and with some of the 
savings contingent upon certain installation and design details that are largely beyond the 
consumer’s understanding.54  In the commercial sector a key issue is often corporate 
commitment – high level financial decision makers do not see electricity as a key 
business issue and do not perceive it to be a controllable category of costs.55  However 
                                                 
47 see infra Part 5. 
48 Bertschi, supra note 5 at 828. 
49 Sutherland, supra note 26 at 365. 
50 EPA, Energy Star – The Power to Protect the Environment Through Energy Efficiency 2.  Available at 
www.epa.gov. (EPA Energy Star Paper); National Commission on Energy Policy, Ending the Energy 
Stalemate: A Bipartisan Strategy to Meet America’s Energy Challenges 31, Washington, DC (2004) 
(NCEP Paper).  
51 Norbert Wohlgemuth, Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency in Liberalized European Electricity 
Markets, 10 European Environment 1, 4 (2000). 
52 Chamberlin and Herman, supra note 5 at 328-30. 
53 EPA Energy Star Paper, supra note 52 at 3. 
54 Id. 
55 EPA Energy Star Paper, supra note 52 at 10; personal communication with Dan Esty. 
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efficiency gains clearly exist to be captured.  Over 50% of the avoided greenhouse gas 
emissions that EPA has achieved through its Energy Star program in the past 10 years (a 
proxy for energy saved, which includes both heat and electricity savings) has come from 
what the EPA calls “Superior Energy Management”.56  This is the EPA’s term for a series 
of actions that combined lower transaction and information costs for business decision 
makers – including contacting top decision makers to convince them of the possible gains 
from saving energy and providing benchmarks and other measurement tools for these 
companies to use.57 
 
The difference between the information and transaction costs faced by utilities and 
consumers creates a phenomenon known as the payback gap. As a function of the market 
barriers they face, individuals and businesses have a higher expected return than utilities. 
Surveys show that for consumers to install energy efficient technologies they want to see 
a payback on their investment at an annual rate of 30% or greater.58  The recent National 
Commission on Energy Policy report concludes that “considerable empirical evidence 
indicates that consumers and business managers routinely forego efficiency opportunities 
with payback times as short as 6 months to three years – effectively demanding annual 
rates of return on efficiency investments in excess of 40-100%.”59  Without quantifying 
the figure, the economist Paul Joskow has also concluded that “there is fairly compelling 
evidence that consumers use what appear to be very high implicit discount rates when 
they evaluate energy-efficiency investments.”60  The reasons for these high discount rates 
are unclear, and may reflect any number of market imperfections or cognitive biases.61 
 
Utilities, by contrast, do not expect a return much over 15% at most on their investments 
in generation capacity.  Thus many efficiency improvements that could be done by the 
homeowner will instead by replaced by new generation capacity built by the utility.  And 
since under cost based ratemaking a utility has no incentive to reduce its rate base and is 
incentivized to over-invest in capital (the Averch-Johnson effect), it will not voluntarily 
choose to substitute its investment into new capacity with reductions in energy 
consumption that would obviate the need for such investment. 
 
But again, from an economic point of view the information gap between consumers and 
utilities is economically efficient,62 a rational response to the cost of that information.  On 
this view there is still a role for regulatory interference in the market, but it is limited.  
Regulators ought to interfere if energy efficiency information has the characteristic of 
being a public good, that is, of benefit to society and likely to be underproduced by the 
private market.63  Or put differently, if a regulation can reduce information and 
transaction costs greater in value than the cost of the regulation itself, this is a step 
                                                 
56 EPA Energy Star Paper, supra note 52 at 14 
57 Id. at 10. 
58 Bertschi, supra note 5 at 828-29 
59 NCEP Paper, supra note 52 at 31. 
60 Paul L. Joskow, Utility Subsidized Energy Efficiency Programs, 20 Annual Review of Energy and the 
Environment 526, 531 (1995). 
61 Id. 
62 Sutherland, supra note 26 at 364. 
63 Id. 
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towards correcting a market failure.  If the implementation of the regulation will cost 
society more than the value of the information and transaction costs it overcome, the 
regulator should not act.   
 
In conclusion, opponents of energy efficiency policies often agree with proponents on 
some key issues, such as the existence of environmental externalities and other market 
failures.  But opponents often hold that while it is true that markets for electricity suffer 
from market failures, these are caused primarily by regulation - thus the answer is not 
further regulation to promote energy efficiency but fixing prices through deregulation.64 
Energy efficiency proponents debate the extent to which market failures are purely the 
result of regulation – arguing that environmental externalities are important, and that 
transaction and information costs can be reduced by regulation whose benefits outweigh 
its costs.65 
 Opponents of energy efficiency policies argue that environmental externalities, while 
real, ought to be dealt with through market mechanisms.66 Proponents of energy 
efficiency feel that energy efficiency is a necessary addition to the stable of measures 
used to combat environmental externalities in practice.  
 
In sum, there are strong policy considerations behind the pursuit of energy efficiency.  
These range from the highly politicized and largely invalid belief that energy efficiency 
will cure American dependence on foreign oil, to the contested disputes around a variety 
of regulatory and structural market failures, to the considerations surrounding 
environmental externalities.  These policy drivers have combined in the past to create a 
role for energy efficiency in the regulated electricity sector. 
5. Energy Efficiency under regulation 
 
This section examines what energy efficiency has meant in practice under regulation.  It 
also examines the empirical debate about whether energy efficiency measures taken in 
the regulated era have worked, and have been cost justified. 
  
The fundamental problem of energy efficiency under regulation is this: all the incentives 
are in the wrong places.  Homeowners are limited for the reasons discussed above to 
finding only a very small number of energy efficiency improvements to be cost effective.  
Transactions costs also make it difficult for outside third parties with more knowledge 
than homeowners.  To be sure, these third parties lower costs and thereby make a greater 
number of efficiency measures possible, but there are still barriers faced.  By far the best 
suited actor to engage in efficiency measures is the utility.  The utility has the technical 
expertise of the third party expert combined with the savings of a distributor – reduced 
demand means less investment in infrastructure capacity is needed, adding a whole new 
type of saving to the mix that is unavailable to every other actor.  But under traditional 
                                                 
64  Bertschi, supra note 5 at 828.   
65  Joseph Eto, Suzie Kito, Leslie Shown, and Richard Sonnenblick, Where Did the Money Go? The Cost 
and Performance of the Largest Commercial Sector DSM Programs, 21(2) The Energy Journal 23, 42 
(2000); Perkins, supra note 29 at 994. 
66 Sutherland, supra note 26 at 369; Bertschi, supra note 5 at 850-51. 
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cost-based ratemaking it is against the interests of utilities to engage in the pursuit of 
electricity use savings. 
 
To deal with this fundamental difficulty regulators developed different plans that all 
impact four different areas of regulatory policy: environmental regulations, infrastructure 
planning requirements, retail rates, and subsidies.67  Regulators have had a relatively free 
hand from courts to work on these issues, even where policy interventions affect the price 
of electricity.  The “hands off” attitude adopted by the Supreme Court in cases like 
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co68 or Duquesne Light Co. v. 
Barasch69 told regulators that the court would not find constitutional obstacles to their 
efforts.  While Congress, the President, and voters might hold regulators politically 




Environmental regulations are generally outside the scope of this paper, but they are 
relevant in so much as environmental regulations, in particular siting requirements, can 
either make it difficult to bring new capacity on line,70 or can raise the cost of electricity 
generation.  Either outcome affects energy efficiency policy by making it more of a 
physical necessity or more cost effective.  In brief, both outcomes have happened.  Over 
the past 40 years regulators have tightened siting requirements and demanded pollution 
control that in turn raised the cost of electricity generation from fossil fuels and nuclear 




Planning requirements are generally given the name Integrated Resource Planning 
(IRP).71  IRP is a requirement that some party, typically either the local electricity 
commission or the vertically integrated utility, forecast demand.72  The regulator, the 
utility, or an outside consultant would then develop a plan to meet projected demand 
based on reaching the least cost outcome, drawing on both supply side (new generation) 
and demand side measures.73 Most regulations required the combination of supply and 
demand side measures so as to achieve the least-cost outcome.74 That is, DSM measures 
were to be pursued to the extent that the regulator believed (or the party charged with 
planning would argue) that they were cheaper than developing new capacity or even 
generating electricity on existing equipment.  IRP is a technique used commonly around 
                                                 
67 David Nichols, The Role of Regulators: Energy Efficiency, 18 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 295, 296-97 (2001). 
68 320 U.S. 591 (1944). 
69 488 U.S. 299 (1989). 
70 Joskow, supra note 2 at 374-5. 
71 Bertschi, supra note 5 at 829-830. 
72 Bertschi, supra note 5 at 834-35. 
73 Nichols, supra note 69 at 297. 
74 Id. 
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the United States and internationally – it has remained in use in some states that have not 
restructured, whereas other non-restructured states have allowed IRP legislation to 
lapse.75  
 
More inventively, in some jurisdictions the “least cost outcome” was also adjusted to 
account for environmental externalities.76  This was a controversial policy that ultimately 
was not long lived.  Experimentation with “environmental adders” to account for 
externalized costs began in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s in jurisdictions like 
California and Massachusetts and was rather quickly over.77  In Massachusetts the 
attempt to account for externalities was led by the state’s department of public utilities 
acting under authority delegated from the state legislature.  The Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court ruled against the program, finding that it was beyond the scope of 
authority delegated to the regulator by the state legislature.78  In California the effort was 
lead by the legislature, who authorized the Public Utility Commission (PUC) to include 
the value of environmental costs in calculations of the cost-effectiveness of energy 
resources.79 When the PUC tried to implement this by adding environmental benefits or 
subtracting environmental costs to calculate set asides for Qualifying Facilities under 
PURPA the FERC held their actions to be a violation of the law, suggesting that the state 
could better achieve its environmental goals through support of renewable energy and 




If planning is the first large area in which regulators could interfere to promote energy 
efficiency, the second is in the calculation of retail rates.  As discussed in Part 3, retail 
rates under traditional cost-based ratemaking do not reflect marginal costs.  Two 
techniques have been suggested by commentators to modify regulated prices – time of 
use rates (or peak load pricing) and inclining blocks.81 Time of use rates refer to rates that 
increase in blocks when demand for electricity is highest, and are in common use.82 In 
their purest form time of use rates go from being a fixed two or three stage type of pricing 
to real-time retail rates for industrial, commercial, and perhaps some day even residential 
consumers, thus actually making these customers pay the marginal cost of power.83 
Inclining blocks are the inverse of bulk purchase discounts – rather than rewarding 
customers for consuming more electricity, an escalating rate is charged – the more power 
consumed the more expensive the next kWh becomes.  This is a method already in use in 
California after the electricity crisis.84 
                                                 
75 Nichols, supra note 69 at 297. 
76 Perkins, supra note 29 at 1018-19. 
77 Id. at 1021. 
78 Mass. Elec. Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Utils., 643 N.E.2d 1029, 1034 (1994). 
79 Perkins, supra note 29 at 1021-22 (citing Cal. Pub. Util. Code §701.1(c)). 
80 Id. at 1022 (citing Southern Cal. Edison Co., 71 F.E.R.C. 61,269 at 62,080 (June 2, 1995)). 
81 Nichols, supra note 69 at 300; Bertschi, supra note 5 at 842. 
82 Borenstein, supra note 20 at 204. 
83 Id.  
84 Personal experience. 
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Inclining blocks are an uncomplicated energy efficiency tool.  But real time pricing 
(RTP) is a more complicated story. This issue is elaborated below, (SEE INFRA P._) but 
in brief it should be noted now that RTP is used to decrease peak loads.  While that is 
doubtless an economically efficient move on its face, the net electricity savings and 
environmental impact of shaving peak depend on several factors.  It could be that shaving 
peak has a negative environmental impact by decreasing the use of peaking assets with a 
low environmental impact and increasing the use of non-peak assets with higher 
environmental impact.  Thus RTP doubtless increases the efficiency of electricity use, but 




The last area of importance to discuss in a regulated electricity sector is the creation of 
subsidies for energy efficiency.  This includes the creation of incentives for electric 
utilities to implement energy efficiency measures. In order to overcome the previously 
discussed shortcomings of cost-based ratemaking, regulators use revenue adjustment 
mechanisms.85 Some mechanisms set the utility’s profits as fixed based on past 
experience to assure them their normal rate of return, and then regulators often add 
incentives on top for achieving efficiency targets.  In other jurisdictions utility 
expenditures on energy efficiency are considered part of the rate base, so they earn a 
return on them, and sometimes were further rewarded for meeting certain savings 
targets.86  
 
As discussed earlier, this structure is problematic for monitoring because it encourages 
utilities to over-report energy savings while actually minimizing them. These extra 
payments to the utilities need to be financed. Typically this is done through higher 
electricity prices or a surcharge on consumers bills for energy efficiency measures.87 In 
some cases the surcharge is a charge per kWh of use, thus those customers that use the 
most electricity pay for its conservation.  In other cases the fixed charge component of 
rates is increased and thus every customer in a class pays an equal share.88  
 
A third common technique is to increase the time between rate cases and affix a revenue 
cap on utility earnings.  Since rates are set during a rate case and stay unchanged until the 
next, the utility has an incentive to increase efficiency between rate cases because it 
captures the lower cost of service delivery.  A revenue cap sets the total revenue the 
utility can extract from each customer during the rate period.  The cap discourages the 
utility from aggressively trying to increase sales since increased sales will not result in 
increased revenue.  While the average cost per unit sold will drop, the total cost will 
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continue to increase.  The optimal course for the utility is therefore to maximize return 
from existing customers without increasing their electricity use.89  
 
The Empirical Debate 
 
An important question, then, is whether energy efficiency policy has actually worked in 
regulated markets.  The answer is a qualified yes.  Certainly energy efficiency 
interventions, run by the federal government and focused on information provision, seem 
to be strong successes.  The success of regulated utilities in reducing electricity demand 
through either information provision or more extensive (and expensive) intervention, is 
far more debatable.  The question is whether a cost-benefit analysis shows that the energy 
efficiency measures used to date are worthwhile – that is, whether the measures forced by 
regulatory intervention to date have resulted in energy savings more valuable than the 
total cost to all the parties involved in achieving those measures.  If this condition holds 
true, if energy efficiency measures are overcoming market failures, this does not mean 
that we have reached an economically optimal point.90 But it does mean that at least the 
regulatory interventions are doing more good than harm – an important second best 
outcome.   
 
Utility Based Measures 
One of the most frequently cited studies, conducted by Paul Joskow in 1992, found that 
when energy efficiency measures are conducted by utilities they overstate the benefits of 
conservation activities by failing to report all of the relevant costs, counting savings 
measures that consumers would have implemented anyway, and attributing overly long 
lives to the measures they take.91  Nonetheless, while the study concluded that utilities 
overstate the benefits of their programs and understate the costs, it did not conclude that 
these programs were unjustified even at the reduced benefits and increased costs.  Joskow 
has, however, indicated skepticism of the sector, concluding that utility subsidized energy 
efficiency is best understood from a political economic perspective.92 Joskow views the 
advent of utility based energy efficiency programs as a triumph of environmentalists in 
capturing the regulated electricity market to advance their agenda of having the public 
pay for energy efficiency and renewable energy programs they favor.93 
 
Without disputing Joskow’s explanation of how these programs came to pass, it is 
possible to question whether they have been a good thing or a bad thing.  A number of 
other experts have concluded that while Joskow’s methodology was correct, his dataset 
was too limited and included a number of small and non-representative DSM programs 
that included programs explicitly targeted as low-income support programs that were 
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never intended to be cost-effective.94  Using the same methodology with a data set that 
included only programs reporting actual consumption data from consumers, of a similar 
nature, and with few unreported costs, results in the conclusion that utilities do not 
overreport reductions where conditions (such as requiring the use of actual consumption 
data) make it difficult to do so.95  Thus while utilities have an incentive to distort results, 
careful monitoring can prevent this. 
 
Utilities often have an incentive to misreport their achievements because their 
expenditures on energy efficiency are considered part of the rate base, so they earn a 
return on them, and sometimes are given a further bonus by regulators that reward them 
above the set rate of return for meeting certain targets set in terms of watts saved, 
irrespective of load growth.96  Thus utilities under these sorts of regulatory schemes have 
an incentive to overreport energy savings to increase their rate base with regulatory 
compensation for “losses” incurred by their overstated reductions, while surreptitiously 
minimizing actual savings so as not to reduce their rate base in reality.97  
 
Given these potential problems research has found wide variations in the success and cost 
of DSM programs.98 The type of DSM measures introduced and the level at which 
consumers become eligible for incentives greatly influence the costs and benefits of 
programs.99 
 
Loughran and Kulick, based on a regression comparing data from 324 utilities over time, 
conclude that utilities do overstate their savings greatly – claiming that energy efficiency 
measures save energy at a cost of 2 or 3 cents per kWh (lower than the cost of most any 
form of new generation), while the actual figure varies between 6 and 17 cents per 
kWh.100   Given that the price of electricity in the United States is nowhere, I believe, 
above 11 or 12 cents per kWh, that is quite significant.  However the researchers also 
conclude that energy efficiency measures are not invalid per se, merely that they are 
targeted overly broadly instead of at the margin and thus run into selection bias – the 
energy efficiency measures often compensate consumers who would have made the 
investments regardless.101 
 
In contrast, other researchers have concluded that energy efficiency measures are highly 
cost effective, reducing electricity use at a cost of approximately 3.2 cents per kWh, 
relative to what it would have cost the utility to provide that electricity through new 
construction or purchase of power.102   
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Thus the empirical data points out several things.  First, there are highly cost-effective 
energy efficiency measures available.  Second, there are great problems in trying to give 
a utility the incentive to effectuate them.  To date the empirical data have not been 
sufficiently strong to sway the debate over utility based energy efficiency measures in a 
regulated world definitively in either direction.  But the data do suggest that there will be 
a continued role for efficiency measures in a deregulated market – there are cost-effective 
savings out there.  A key empirical question for the future is whether under deregulation 
the market will achieve those savings on its own or not, and who is the best placed party 




It has become abundantly clear that there is scope to reduce information and transaction 
costs cost-effectively.  Our current system of electricity use is far from being 
economically efficient.  Consumers of electricity typically do not know when demand 
peaks occur, are not aware of how to design buildings and processes to use less 
electricity, and, especially in the case of residential consumers, understand little about 
how to compare the long run costs of different electric appliances.  These problems are 
essentially informational barriers, and there is nothing geographically unique about them. 
This makes them a prime candidate for a single regulatory intervention.  EPA’s Energy 
Star program is a good case study of the effectiveness of these measures in general, and 
raises the question of who is the best placed party to generate efficiency savings.  At least 
on information provision, the government seems to be doing a good job. 
 
The EPA’s Energy Star program aims to lower market barriers to energy efficiency by 
focusing on information gaps, not by subsidizing specific investments.103  The program 
provides appliance labels, stimulus to businesses to consider electricity savings, 
measurement tools, and similar informational services.104  The program has been highly 
cost effective to date for all parties.  The EPA reports that thanks to the Energy Star 
program energy users (heat and electricity combined) saw a net savings of $8 billion in 
2003, and will see a net savings of $89 billion from 2003-2013.105  From the EPA’s point 
of view the program is money well spent – every federal dollar spent in the program 
results in more than $15 in private sector investment in energy efficiency, a greater than 





6. EE under deregulation 
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To understand how energy efficiency measures can transition to a deregulated 
environment, it is important to first understand what deregulation means.  Before this, 
however, one note is in order: energy efficiency will not disappear in a competitive 
market.  It is not the case that without government intervention energy efficiency will fail 
to happen.  To the extent that there is a profit to be made from energy savings, private 
actors will fill the gap.  Indeed, private actors or subsidiaries of existing utilities, often 
called performance contractors or energy service companies (ESCOs), have been active 
in regulated markets so long as there was profit to be made.107 The issue is one of price 
and the amount of savings achieved.  In a fully deregulated market – one with 
competitive markets and no requirements on any actors to meet any efficiency standards - 
the amount of energy conserved depends entirely on the price of electricity, which 
determines which energy saving measures are worth implementing.  To the extent that the 
cost of electricity still does not reflect its true social cost in the deregulated market, we 
face the same problem as was faced in a regulated market. 
 
Having examined the deregulated context above, we can summarize its salient features as 
follows:  
 
1. Generation is becoming competitive. 
2. Retail is, in a few jurisdictions, trying to become competitive, but is monopolized or 
price capped (or both) in most jurisdictions.   
3. Environmental regulations, as in a regulated market, continue to exist and internalize 
some externalities while not accounting for others.   
 
This section will examine the impact of these three key features of deregulation on 




The primary drive of deregulation is the creation of competitive markets for generation.   
This has several impacts on energy efficiency.  First, there is an end to Integrated 
Resource Planning (IRP) of the type that requires utilities to avoid new plant investments 
by providing energy efficiency gains.  This actually changes relatively little since the 
utilities still exist and can still engage in IRP without owning generating plants.  Second, 
and more importantly, moving to competitive generation creates stronger demand for 
RTP, with or without competitive retail markets.   
 
IRP requirements used to force utilities to avoid investment in plants if lower cost 
investments in DSM could obviate the need for new plants.  Now that utilities no longer 
own significant generating assets, the demand not to invest in new plant is less relevant.  
Most utilities still own some generating assets, thus in theory IRP rules may still have 
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some effect.  But this issue is really a red herring because the critical question is not 
whether a utility owns its own plant or not, but rather whether there is a monopolist 
utility at all.  IRP is not a dead idea.  Currently it is being rebranded as “least cost 
transmission and distribution” – i.e. IRP without generation investment requirements.108  
It is also called, by some, Resource Portfolio Management.109  This is a logical 
development for IRP – planning works as well without the generators as with them.  
Transmission and distribution infrastructure is expensive to build.  There will be 
situations in which electricity savings could obviate the need for new power lines.  And 
for the utility the choice is simply whether to sign a contract with a generator or pay for 
DSM.  Regulators can still require utilities to analyze the potential for energy savings and 
make DSM investments where it is cheaper than contracting for electricity. 
 
The real change engendered by competitive generation is a move to RTP. As discussed 
above, the structural rigidity of electricity markets creates a strong incentive for 
generators in a competitive market to behave strategically. 110  That is, because demand is 
highly inelastic under conventional metering and pricing systems, generators can 
withhold supply to generate far higher prices without fear that demand will drop. 
 
Part of the solution to this problem is to create demand elasticity.  Thus competitive 
generation creates a desire for RTP to limit the ability of generators to game the system.  
This is why RTP is often discussed in the deregulatory context.  In fact RTP can be done 
with or without competitive retail markets, or, for that matter, with or without 
competitive generation.   
 
The current experience with RTP is limited, but some modeling and empirical results 
exist.  The experimental results suggest that RTP is certainly popular with customers and 
tremendously cost effective on its face, leading to large decreases in peak loads.  In one 
recent experiment it cost $35m to set up the experiment for 23,000 large customers, and 
led to a drop in peak demand for those customers of 500 megawatts, which saved the 
utilities $250-300m in capacity additions.111  
 
The most recent empirical data come from California, where regulators and utility 
companies cooperated on a two year experiment with “dynamic pricing”.112  A variety of 
different variable pricing mechanisms were tried on a pool of some 2,500 customers, both 
residential and commercial.113  The pricing mechanisms experimented with were not pure 
RTP but were basically very high price signals at peak demand times.  In California peak 
loads dropped an average of 15%.114 Nearly 80% of customers in all categories of the 
experiment reduced their electric bills, and customer support for a full scale rollout of 
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RTP was overwhelming.115 The primary effect of the higher peak prices was to encourage 
load shifting.  In some categories overall load reductions were seen but these were 
negligible.  Virtually all of the peak demand drop was made up for in off peak periods.116 
 
The experimental results show that, predictably, RTP works almost exclusively through 
load shifting.  But while load shifting is clearly of facial economic benefit, its 
environmental impact depends on several factors.  In the short term, a recent paper by 
Stephen Holland and Erin Mansur concludes that load shifting has a slight positive 
environmental impact in a market where the peak power that is shaved was oil or other 
fossil fuel production (the mid-Atlantic and Illinois), but that the overall environmental 
impact can be slightly negative where peak power is met by hydro, and higher off peak 
prices encourage older fossil fuel plants to run (the West, Southeast, Great Plains, and 
Eastern Mid-West).117  Thus to understand the efficiency of load shifting, the added 
environmental costs, admittedly slight, must be counted against the savings from creating 
more elastic demand.  In the long term, the effect of RTP is to lower average electricity 
costs, which should discourage investment in energy efficiency, through, for example, 
performance contracting.  Also, the increased use of efficiency measures achievable 
through decreased transaction costs could be cancelled out by decreased electricity costs.  
Thus, in summary, RTP is an effective and popular efficiency measure – it creates 
demand elasticity by providing better information.  RTP promises to encourage more 
efficient energy use through the provision of better information to end users.  But in a 
market where the price of electricity does not reflect externalized costs or hidden 
subsidies, the net environmental effect of RTP could be negative. 
  
Retail Competition?  
 
Beyond the widespread transition to a competitive generation market, the impact of the 
deregulatory movement is more varied.  It is by no means clear that deregulation leads to 
competitive retail markets.  Retail competition is an open question.  As discussed above, 
most jurisdictions do not have retail competition, and even those jurisdictions that have it 
do not have robust competition.  But RTP and advanced metering technologies may help 
change that.  At the very least, RTP and advanced metering data would allow market 
participants to better understand the consumer market, segment it, and “cherry pick” the 
customers they want to target.  Since there is strong potential for retail competition to 
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To the extent that competition is not introduced in the retail sector there is little new to 
say about energy efficiency.   
 
First, as discussed above in “Competitive Generation”, a regulated utility can still pursue 
IRP without owning substantial generation assets.  The question becomes the price of 
kilowatt hours purchased from generators vs. the price of energy savings achievable.  The 
same manipulations of cost based ratemaking that were practiced in the past can still be 
practiced. 
 
Second, the advent of competition in electricity generation means that a regulated 
monopoly will be pushed to RTP.  As discussed above, the ideal way to correct the 
problems caused by average cost pricing is real time marginal cost pricing, and if that is 
not possible then time of use rates are at least some improvement.  Deregulation may 
improve the efficiency of energy choices by stimulating a move to RTP, even if the retail 
side of the market is unchanged.   
 
But deregulation is politically sold as being about lower prices and choice – at some point 
a competitive retail market may be pushed forward.  And in a limited number of 





Where retail competition develops some of the problems of the regulated era disappear.   
In particular, cross subsidies and average cost pricing should be a thing of the past, and 
thus consumers should receive price signals that are closer to real time marginal costs.  
But first, the improved signals are still not perfect, and second, the response to price 
signals is still mitigated by transaction and information costs.  Indeed, in a competitive 
retail market information and transaction costs may even increase.  As the EPA points 
out, often information about energy savings and choices are incomplete and 
inconsistent.118  At least in a regulated market there are fewer actors trying to provide 
such information.  One result should be fewer inconsistencies and a lesser number of 
purported “authorities” seeking to separate the customer and their money.   
 
Price regulation, by definition, largely disappears in a competitive market.  There is no 
longer a regulator who sets a price and can demand that utilities work with customers to 
achieve all energy savings below that price.  Every retail provider sets their own price 
and earns money solely on the basis of sales, not through some regulated subsidy that 
compensates them for earnings lost to efficiency investments.  Instead, if efficiency gains 
are to be made they must be made directly by end users, or by third parties that provide 
energy management services to end users.  This means that price is even more important 
to the achievement of energy efficiency in a deregulated market than it is in a regulated 
market.  To the extent that prices do not reflect social cost, or to the extent that 
information and transaction costs impede the functioning of markets, energy efficiency 
will be even harder to achieve in a competitive market than it was in a monopolized 
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market.  In a competitive retail market a regulator can encourage private sector 
conservation measures, but the achievement of performance contracting will depend 
critically on the cost of electricity.   
 
Retail competition, therefore, certainly does not mean that the need for planning 
disappears.  A competitive market will still suffer from market failures – environmental 
externalities, fossil fuel subsidies, lack of RTP, and information and transaction costs.  
The role of a regulator in the deregulated market will still be to take a macro perspective 
and optimize the system from a social point of view – an idea recently repackaged as 
Strategic Energy Assessment (SEA).119  The idea is that rather than setting planning 
requirements that end in an order to utilities to make certain investments, instead 
regulators will monitor the energy sector as they have in the past, but use their 
observations to set benchmarks for environmental, service, and cost performance through 
the use of other tools.  SEA can be used to determine what new policies should look like 
– the new policies themselves are either existing policies from the regulatory era such as 
siting restrictions, or new tools such as market based environmental mechanisms.  But 
even with this new strategic plan in hand, the major consideration in any attempt to 
regulate the industry will still be price.  It is blatantly obvious but bears repeating: in a 
price based system of electricity consumption regulators will need to continually make 
efforts to bring the price of electricity close to its true social cost.  And where this is not 
possible, they will need to take other steps to bring consumption down to the level they 
believe is efficient. 
 
To the extent that utility DSM was used to solve problems caused by a specific regulatory 
policy it is no longer needed once that regulation is repealed.  But to the extent that 
market price does not track the social cost of electricity because of environmental 
externalities some intervention into retail rates is warranted.  While some regulation 
exists to internalize externalities through pollution control measures, this by no means 
accounts for all of the environmental externalities. Currently mercury and carbon, to 
name but two important pollutants, are inadequately accounted for or completely 
unaccounted for in American markets.  Thus regulators will still be called upon to 
exercise their power to structure the electric sector.  The question then is what tools ought 




One important part of the “deregulated” regulatory scheme is environmental regulation.  
Indeed, this rises in importance as direct price controls and forced investments in energy 
efficiency through IRP fade.  Although conceptually independent from electricity 
deregulation, a host of new market based environmental mechanisms are currently being 
discussed that could eventually form a significant element in a deregulated electricity 
market. There are three market based environmental mechanisms of interest that are 
rising in importance today: pollution taxes, portfolio standards, and emissions trading. 
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Pollution taxes are an old idea, but they are currently old wine in a new bottle.  The 
“environmental adders” that jurisdictions like California and Massachusetts experimented 
with are simply hidden pollution taxes.120  Pollution taxes have been discussed in relation 
to a host of environmental problems in the last decade.  Their performance has been 
understood since Pigou and is unproblematic in the abstract.  The core issues are 
empirical and political.  
 
The first problem is the empirical one - determining the true social cost of pollution.  As 
discussed above, electricity costs do not reflect externalities, but the size of the 
externalities that go unreflected is contested.  Without entering into an extensive 
discussion, the problems involved in determining the size of an externality include (1) the 
uncertainty surrounding the net environmental (non-monetary) impacts of different 
electricity generating methods, and (2) the uncertainties and assumptions needed to 
monetize those impacts.  On the physical side we have the fundamental problem of 
ecology – that you cannot change just one thing.  Ecosystems, like economies, are 
interconnected complex systems, and we understand even less about them than we 
understand about human economies.  The dynamic feedbacks in natural systems, coupled 
with our initial uncertainty about the size and nature of material flows between the 
electricity industry and the environment mean that we are not exactly sure what we are 
doing.  On the monetary side we have a host of different problems – deciding on the 
proper standard to use for hedonic pricing (willingness to pay, willingness to accept), 
deciding on the appropriate discount rates, developing accurate shadow prices without 
good data about marginal choices, etc.  Thus any attempt to use pollution taxes will 
require simplifying assumptions and conservative value judgments. 
 
The second problem, the political one, is every bit as difficult as the first.  Pollution taxes 
leveled on the public, as opposed to hidden somehow in tariffs or levied on industrial 
polluters and passed on in the price of consumer goods, are never popular.  They are rare 
in every environmentally related field.  My understanding of this phenomenon is very 
rudimentary.  Perhaps they are too transparent and the public really does not value the 
environment as highly as environmentalists would like them to.  Or perhaps there are 
information gaps that prevent people from understanding the reason or the importance of 
these taxes to their overall welfare.  Or perhaps there are other explanations related to a 
variety of social-psychological drivers.  This is an enormously interesting and broad 
subject that, in the interests of parsimony, I wish to avoid.  Instead it is enough to note 
that if a pollution tax were to be used, then for political reasons it would have to be used 
in the wholesale (generation), not the retail market.  Alternatively, the currently popular 
option is to hide the pollution tax as a portfolio standard. 
 
A portfolio standard is essentially a mirror image of a pollution tax.  A pollution tax 
works on the principle of setting the price of a good to achieve a desired quantity.  A 
portfolio standard sets the desired quantity of a good and incidentally results in a market 
price for that good, thereby ensuring that the desired quantity is delivered in the most 
efficient way possible.  Thus a portfolio standard is simply a way to work backwards and 
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try to set what the regulator believes to be the quantity of saved electricity that would be 
achieved in an efficient market. 
 
Portfolio standards are the new market based tool directly related to the electricity sector.  
The idea was originally to create a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) – a state level 
policy that requires that a certain percentage of a utility’s overall or new generating 
capacity or energy sales be derived from renewable resources.121  RPS exist in 18 
American states.122  The idea has been adapted to create Energy Efficiency Portfolio 
Standards (EEPS).  Although not as common as an RPS, the idea of an EEPS is gaining 
traction - Texas already requires that 10% of new load growth be met with energy 
efficiency.123 
 
Another commonly discussed environmental market mechanism is emissions trading (or 
tradable pollution rights).  While portfolio standards essentially create an artificial 
demand for electricity conservation, emissions trading creates an artificial demand for 
pollution reduction.  Emissions trading requires the establishment of a government 
licensing program that limits the ability of regulated parties to emit a certain pollutant.  
The licenses act as a “bubble” on the pollution.  Licensed parties may trade their licenses 
so that those parties who can reduce their pollution emissions at least cost do so while 
those parties who find it more expensive to reduce their pollution buy licenses from the 
more efficient pollution reducers.  Gradually the regulator reduces the amount of 
pollution that each license entitles a party to emit.  Thus pollution reductions are achieved 
over time at the lowest possible cost – the market sets the price for the marginal unit of 
pollution emitted.  The familiar American example is Title VI of the Clean Air Act, the 
sulphur trading mechanism created to control acid rain.124  A similar program is currently 
being proposed to regulate mercury emissions from utilities.125   
 
Although EEPS are directly related to energy efficiency, neither RPS measures or 
emissions trading are.  However, as was noted above, energy efficiency must be 
considered in conjunction with both RPS and emissions trading because energy 
efficiency will lead to pollution reductions through decreased consumption of power 
from the grid.  In a market where pollution reductions have value, someone will try to 
claim the credit for the achievements of energy efficiency, and if multiple parties claim 
the credit, a problem called “double counting”, the integrity of the market is called into 
question – you get a market full of lemons.  Some analysts advocate energy efficiency set 
asides under emissions trading – a certain number of licenses reserved for proven 
efficiency achievements, to be claimed either by the utility paying for them or the 
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customer directly.126 But proponents of tradable pollution rights and renewable energy 
credits are concerned with the impact that energy efficiency measures will have on the 
value and integrity of these new commodities if energy efficiency proponents succeed in 
funding energy efficiency through the integration of energy savings from efficiency into 
other clean energy markets.127   
 
The issue of double counting raises the question of exactly how energy efficiency can be 
financed or subsidized in a competitive market.  Again, private contractors will finance 
efficiency measures where it is cost effective – the question is how to grasp greater 
efficiency gains that the private market will provide.  The predominant answer to this 
problem is a public benefits charge, a simple tax that originally debuted in the old 
regulated environment.128 This tax can be charged on a per kWh basis or on a flat per 
customer basis, with the former being preferable from an energy efficiency point of view 
as it provides a greater incentive to save power129. 
 
A last question about the deregulated era is the consequences of the deregulation process.   
In particular there is the question of the “stranded debt” that developed under de-
regulation.  Generally, old utility debt is being recovered from customers, more so than in 
other formerly deregulated industries.130  Some of this debt recovery is taking the form of 
use-insensitive charges when it could, as with a public benefits charge, be tacked on per 
unit of service demanded.131  Another issue are exit fees.  These are fees charged by 
utilities in a deregulated market to customers who no longer wish to purchase power from 
the utility.  These fees are being used to recoup stranded debt too.  They are a 
disincentive to decentralized power provision, which since it removes a burden from the 




There are valid reasons to pursue energy efficiency – market failures that are not only the 
fault of regulation but of the limitations of markets to properly value environmental 
externalities.  So long as the environment matters, there will be an appropriate role for 
regulation.   
 
And current practices are far from efficient.  A recent study by Resources for the Future 
estimated that in 2000, appliance standards alone saved an amount of energy (heat and 
electricity) equivalent to approximately 3% of overall building related energy use, at 
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approximately half the price of providing that much energy.133  The EPA estimates that 
the energy efficiency measures they have encouraged over the past 10 years cost 2-4 
cents per kilowatt hour saved.134  Similarly, researchers at Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory concluded that, at lifecycle costs of 1-5 cents per kilowatt hour, there are 
combined energy savings achievable over the next few decades in the United States to 
offset 25% of the projected growth in energy demand from 2010-2030.135  There is a role 
for energy efficiency policies in a deregulated market, whether it is a price adjustment by 
regulation, federal information provision to overcome transaction costs, or a modified 
form of IRP for monopoly utilities. 
 
The history of deregulation shows that deregulation does not mean the end of regulation – 
there are strong political interests from consumers rights advocates, utility advocates, and 
environmentalists for preventing the establishment of fully competitive markets.  Some of 
the techniques used in the old regulated environment can be preserved in the new 
regulatory (deregulated) environment.  The techniques that are still of use are those that 
are unaffected by market structure and those that are used in parts of the market that are 
relatively untouched by deregulation.   
 
But regulators seeking to advance environmental goals in the electric sector must now 
develop new tools.  At the same time they must also maintain their traditional role as 
analysts of the big picture.  In particular, environmental regulation promises a new set of 
policy tools that both justify and advance energy efficiency in a more competitive system.  
Simultaneously, the move to competitive generation provides an opening for RTP, a 
price-based approach to the more efficient use of electricity through load shifting.  Above 
all, regulators must maintain a focus on environmental externalities and the price 
distortions that are still present in the deregulated environment, correcting them through 
the use of traditional energy efficiency measures, encouragement of the private sector, 
and market based environmental mechanisms. 
                                                 
133 NCEP report, supra note 52 at 31.  The RFF study is available in the technical appendix to the NCEP 
report.  
134 EPA, Energy Star and Other Voluntary Programs 2003 Annual Report 10, available at www.epa.gov. 
135 NCEP report, supra note 52 at 33.  The LBL study is available in the technical appendix to the NCEP 
report.  
